When presidents seek support for a specific foreign policy they must find a way to suture the political differences between the four discourse communities that constitute the foreign policy public-unilateralists (Fields, 2002; Haass, 1999; Lake, 2000; Tucker, 1999), multilateralists (Aviel, 1999; Sullivan, 1999; Rahman, 2002), regionalists (Wallerstein, 1979; 1991; Ceglowski, 2000; Ohmae, 2000) and coalition builders (Bokhari, 1997)-in order to maximize support for their prescribed approach. One of the language strategies available to presidents in making such appeals is through what Michael McGee (1980) calls an ideograph. Researchers traditionally focus on how ideographs work in isolation, and pay no attention to how a person in one speech and one moment in time can interact with multiple audiences (Condit, 1987; Delgado, 1995; 1999; Parry-Giles, 1995). This synchronic, or in the moment approach, helps further understanding of ideographs by analyzing a moment when a president used an ideograph to engage and persuade multiple audiences simultaneously. The ideograph <freedom> provided Bush with a way to respond to a situation where he knew he had a limited opportunity to articulate a message for maximum effect to multiple audiences who would receive it differently.

Foreign policy also presents a unique area where ideographs can enhance a president's persuasive power. The four discourse communities that comprise the foreign policy public represent four groups that interpret these ideographs in different, and often oppositional, ways. In that vein, examining how a president used a particular ideograph to appeal for support on a foreign policy issue provides us with a better understanding of precisely how ideographs work to seemingly unite disparate elements of a public, and provide practical political benefits to the president.

To illustrate this extension to the understanding of the ideograph concept and contribute to our knowledge of foreign policy rhetoric, I analyzed President George W. Bush's use of the term <freedom> in speeches and press conferences delivered between his initial declaration of Iraq as a major foreign policy issue at the United Nations (UN) in 2002, until the start of hostilities in March 2003. I argue <freedom> helped the president successfully appeal for support from unilateralists, multilateralists, regionalists, and coalition builders simultaneously by encouraging a different interpretation of its meaning in each community. Before discussing the analysis of Bush's rhetoric, however, it is important to briefly unpack the dynamics within each of the discourse communities during the lead-up to War in Iraq.

In placing Iraq center-stage Bush opened up a debate between the four discourse communities as to how the US should prosecute the War on Terror. The debate among the discourse communities sprang from the public impression the Bush administration sought to act unilaterally (Bruni, 12 September 2002; Wang, 2002; Allen, 10 February, 2003). The criticisms of that perceived approach were rooted in an inherent distaste for unilateralism, and a preference for one of the other foreign policy approach options. The notion that the US would and should conduct a unilateral foreign policy is not a new idea. Melvyn P. Leffler (2005) points out that the Bush foreign policy has more in common with its predecessors than its critics admit, in that since the beginning of the Cold War the US has sought to act unilaterally in what it saw as the best interests of the world. The only significant change to foreign policy was the inclusion of the right to preventative action when threatened, which high level members of the Bush administration like Vice-President Dick Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz touted (Ananieva, 2004); they felt Iraq warranted such preventative action. As David J. Trachtenberg (2004) puts it, when such unilateral preventative action is taken "the entire world is safer" (p. 3). Unilateralists advocate a benevolent version of acting alone that is enacted for the good of the world, whether "the world" believes the actions are necessary or not. Carl Cavanagh Hodge (2003) lays out why unilateralism should be favored, stating, "in a choice between an international community as presently constituted and a frankly imperial United States, therefore, it is a comfort to think that the latter might be an offer" (p. 199). This casts the world as a disordered camp, where only strong action by the strongest nation will achieve world peace. For unilateralists, <freedom> represented a value that justified action either for delivery to where it did not exist or action when <freedom> is threatened.

Multilateralists disagreed with the preemptive policies advocated by the unilateralists, believing such a doctrine would "alienate long-standing US. allies and may undermine the credibility of the United Nations and other international institutions, which the United States helped build" (Cooper, 2002, p. 722). It is precisely this connection of the US to international organizations that multilateralists stress must be used when formulating foreign policy. They wanted the battle in Iraq fought initially with a UN inspection regime, rather than a unilateral invasion. If Bush operated "without UN authorization, [it] would clearly amount to a unilateral act, even if the United States has the support of other countries"(Ehlert, 2002, p. 732).

Multilateralists, then, did not allow for a coalition building or unilateral approach, but rather placed the utmost importance on going through existing international organizations to legitimize action against Iraq. For multilateralists, <freedom> represented the value that the US and others in organizations such as the UN and NATO shared.

Regionalists concerned themselves less with whether the US used the UN, and more with the goals of intervention in Iraq and the ramifications of such action. Members of this discourse community saw the possibility for "the resolution of some regional issues and concern among rogue states, terrorist sponsors, and terrorist organizations about their fate," as a result of action against Iraq and Saddam Hussein (Reich, 2003, p. 116). The implication here is that a US invasion of Iraq should be conducted with an eye toward solving other larger issues throughout the region. Attacking Iraq should serve as an example to those in the region who are not in line with the rest of the world. Such nations fear unilateral US military action, and so regionalists like Andrew Flibbert wish for a policy that clearly outlines US intervention and reconstruction goals as exemplary rather than imperialistic in nature (Flibbert, 2003). <Freedom> provided Bush with a way that could characterize U.S. objectives in Iraq in just such a manner.

When it comes to Iraq, members of the coalition builder discourse community appreciated the situation in Iraq a different way. For example, lawmakers in the United States were concerned with the necessity of "refashioning relationships" with foreign nations such as Pakistan and Russia due to their strategic importance in combating terrorism. Concerns over acting without support from countries such as these led some in Congress to seek a requirement for Bush to form an international coalition for action against Iraq (Nather, 2002). Foreign assistance, whether from the UN or not, was a necessity for coalition builders. Bush sought a way to appeal to coalition builders as well as the other discourse communities, and <freedom> provided him with method for doing so. For coalition builders <freedom> became the mobilizing force, in that all countries that loved <freedom> followed the US.

The debate that took place before the Iraq invasion involved how the US connected action in Iraq to the larger War on Terror, as well as the nature of what action should be taken against Iraq. Bush used the ideograph <freedom> to appeal for support from the four disparate discourse communities by suturing the differences that emerged between them during this debate. Each group saw subtle differences in the words' meaning, but ultimately the ideograph functioned to allow the president to garner the support he needed to attack Iraq. In the following section I explicate how Bush used <freedom> to smooth over the debate among the foreign policy discourse communities by encouraging each group to understand his messages as congruent with their worldview.

Unilateralists, multilateralists, regionalists, and coalition builders are each groups to which Bush appeals to for support for his policy toward Iraq. He uses the ideograph whenever he discusses Iraq, and each foreign policy discourse community defines the term differently. Basically, each of these groups hears the same word in the same context, but it means something different to each of them. In the following analysis I will illustrate how ideographs are flexible, symbolic rhetorical tools deployed by President Bush for a material political gain-support for war in Iraq.

Unilateralism and Freedom: Our Way, Right Away

On multiple occasions since Bush addressed the UN about Iraq on September 20, 2001, he tailored his arguments for action to unilateralists, stating that if the UN failed to support a strong stance regarding Iraq, then the United States would take whatever action it deemed necessary. It is within these statements that the ideograph <freedom> is used to ascribe righteousness to the United States and, therefore, rationalize action.

Bush universalizes to the concept of <freedom> when he states, "We go forward with confidence, because we trust in the power of human <freedom> to change lives and nations" (Bush, February 26, 2003). The addition of the term "human" creates a new dimension for the ideograph, establishing it as a characteristic of all humans, not simply Americans, although the statement indicates it is something Americans have a special relationship with that members of other democracies lack. This combination of the universality of <freedom> with the confidence that those who enjoy it can deliver <freedom> to those who do not implicitly justifies any action on the part of the United States taken to ensure the fundamental human right of <freedom>.

Bush justifies the unilateral capability of the United States using the ideograph of <freedom> when he says, "<Free> people will set the course of history, and <free> people will keep the peace of the world" (Bush, February 26, 2003). Here Bush conflates the United States and its people with the idea "<free> people," thereby granting the United States the legitimate authority to take action when world stability is at stake, regardless of whether the UN, or any other multilateral body, supports them. After all, the UN includes several states that are not <free>. The statement simultaneously valorizes <freedom> and justifies unilateral displays of military and political power. Unilateralists become more inclined to support the president when he uses <freedom> to encourage this interpretation.

This incarnation of the ideograph of <freedom> appears again in an even more explicit attempt at defending unilateral action against Iraq. In a national press conference on March 6, 2003, Bush characterizes the leader of Iraq as a "direct threat to this country, to our people, and to all <free> people" (Bush, March 6, 2003). By placing "this country" and "our people" before "all <free> people," Bush is not only establishing the primacy of the United States on the international stage but using that primacy to justify any action taken on behalf of those, in his eyes, who are incapable of doing so themselves. Once again, the idea of the global responsibility of the United States is articulated in defense of the abstraction. This responsibility is something only the United States, because of its perceived unique relationship with <freedom>, can fulfill, thus making action necessarily unilateral.

In these uses <freedom> is something inherently human, a shared characteristic of certain peoples for whom the United States is responsible, but the term also justifies action. As the leader of the only world superpower, and one who holds the idea of <freedom> as paramount, Bush characterizes the essence of the Iraq situation as a battle where "<freedom> is at stake" (Bush, March 6, 2003). He also says the United States "will act, in the name of peace and the name of <freedom>" (Bush, March 6, 2003).

<freedom>, then, the universal human right, is itself enough to justify action on the part of the United States. In short, Bush seems willing to invite the support of the UN, but if it refuses his call the United States will not slow its action in defense of <freedom>. If the UN does not subscribe to the same definition of <freedom> then Bush will act alone. This is an attempt to satisfy the unilateralist segment of his constituency by reserving the right to act, even if others will not.

Bush articulates the notion of exporting the American form of <freedom>: "Now, as before, we will secure our nation, protect our <freedom>, and help others to find <freedom> of their own" (Bush, October 7, 2002). Although he states the US will help others find "<freedom> of their own," he links that action to protecting "our <freedom>." The only form of <freedom> acceptable for others is the American form, for that is the only kind of <freedom> that will not threaten "our <freedom>." It is also important to note that Bush refers to it as "our <freedom>," connoting ownership of the concept. The phrasing is another example of how <freedom> justifies American unilateralism.

Statements indicating that <freedom> is not currently enjoyed by all illustrate the need for its exportation. As Bush puts it, "We are committed to <freedom> for all," (Bush, October 10, 2002) and "either you're with those who love <freedom>, or you're with those who hate innocent life" (Bush, January 3, 2003). Once again the definition held by the United States is universalized, and when absent in a particular place American intervention is justified. In casting <freedom> this way Bush appeals to unilateralists by encouraging them to interpret the word through their worldview. They would support the idea that the defense or promotion of the American version of <freedom> is justification enough for the United States to act.

Ultimately, the ideograph of <freedom> is used in several capacities to appeal to unilateralists. Bush ascribes a universal quality to <freedom>, which the United States defines and defends. <Freedom> is a quality that justifies superpower action, and a value inherent in American policy. When invoked as a justification for action by the United States, support is welcome, but action will be taken whether support is given or not.

Multilateralism: Freedom For/By All

Bush also used <freedom> to articulate a desire to work with the world community when he characterizes actions taken by multilateral bodies such as the UN Security Council as consistent with American interests, describes a global rather than a hegemonic predicate for action, and defines the characteristics of states and actors within a particular vision of the world. For unilateralists <freedom> justifies America acting alone, but multilateralists understand <freedom> as a universal value worthy of defense and would prefer he president frame US foreign policies so countries appear to enjoy global, not just American, authorship of the definition of <freedom>.

Bush seemingly explicates a desire for the world to act in unison toward the Iraqi threat by invoking <freedom> in two ways: "I'm optimistic that <free> nations will show backbone and courage in the face of true threats to peace and <freedom>" (Bush, February 13, 2003). Such a call encourages multilateralist support to the extent it expresses a desire for "<free> nations" to act together in responding to the Iraqi threat. He sets up a scenario where "<free> nations" who do not help in the cause do not value freedom and are easily understood as cowardly. Although the persuasive tactic is heavy-handed, Bush uses the value of <freedom> in an attempt to gain multilateral support for action against Iraq.

Such actions include mandatory inspector access to suspected sites in Iraq as well as witness security for interviews. Bush uses the term <free> to not only signal his support for the UN inspection teams but also to encourage multilateralists to interpret Iraq as an oppressive state whose recalcitrance requires action from all other states. He says, "To ensure that we learn the truth, the regime must allow witnesses to its illegal activities to be interviewed outside the country-and these witnesses must be <free> to bring their families with them so they all are beyond the reach of Saddam Hussein's murder and terror" (Bush, October 7, 2002). This indicts the regime in Iraq as oppressive and tyrannical, and it uses a human example, that of the witnesses, to contrast the <freedom>/oppression binary so as to gain international support for action taken to liberate Iraq.

Bush also frames the establishment of <freedom> in Iraq as the collective responsibility of the global community, and not just an American requirement. On several occasions he uses the phrase "<free> nations" which he says need to "face up to global responsibilities" and "not allow the UN to fade into history as an ineffective, irrelevant, debating society" (Bush, October 16, 2002; February 6, 2003; February 13, 2003). Here Bush encourages multilateralists to believe he sees it is the responsibility of the world to deal with Iraq much as it did in the Persian Gulf War a decade ago. Bush links "<free> nations" and the relevancy of the world's largest multilateral body in an attempt to convince skeptical political partners that when <freedom> is at stake they must act in unison. The ideograph forces a choice between <freedom> and relevancy, or oppression and inaction. <Freedom> appears as the responsibility of all <free> nations, not just the United States.

Bush defines the characteristics of a multilateral body by employing <freedom> as well. He believes that the "community of <free> nations" must be "determined to keep the peace…[and] be a source of stability and security for the world" (Bush, February 13, 2003). This "community of <free> nations" is equated with the United Nations, as Bush calls upon the ideograph of <freedom> to define that organization's mission for the purpose of illustrating how Iraq is the world's responsibility. Bush's apparent concern for the relevancy of the multilateral body by calling it to action in defense of his version of <freedom> allows him to appeal to multilateralists who desire a U.S. foreign policy predicated on organizations such as the UN.

For multilateralists <freedom> is used not to justify action by any one state, but to convince every state of the need for a response. It also defends actions taken by multilateral institutions, so their policies and procedures remain unhindered. As such it is an attempt to placate the multilaterlists in Bush's own domestic constituency, and illustrate to them his desire for international consensus for action in Iraq. In essence, unilateralists use <freedom> to justify a state's action, while multilateralists understand <freedom> as a global cause for which nations are being asked by Bush to fight.

Regionalism: Freedom Here, Here, and then Here

I have illustrated how <freedom> can be understood from a unilateralist and multilateralist perspective. Now I will demonstrate how regionalists understand <freedom> as both a process and an end to itself. One of the major obstacles the US and the UN encountered in forming a coherent multilateral policy toward Iraq has been the perception of that policy within the Middle East. To overcome this, Bush uses <freedom> to illustrate how Iraq exemplifies the needs of the region, not the United States, thus appealing to those who wish to see stability in the region, not the establishment of a western satellite state.

Bush consistently uses <freedom> in a positive manner when he addresses the UN General Assembly on September 12, 2002 and offers the outline of a vision for the Middle East, articulating the consequences of inaction. He says, "The region will remain unstable, with little hope of freedom, and isolated from the progress of our times" (Bush, September 12, 2002). Unless <freedom> is brought to Iraq, the rest of the region will become too unstable for full incorporation into the global community- politically, socially, and economically.

Bush links this process of incorporation through the spread of <freedom> to global responsibility:

The world has a clear interest in the spread of democratic values, because stable and <free> nations do not breed the ideologies of murder….and there are hopeful signs of a desire for <freedom> in the Middle East. Arab intellectuals have called on Arab governments to address the <freedom gap> so their peoples can fully share in the progress of our times. Leaders in the region speak of a new Arab charter that champions internal reform, greater politics participation, economic openness, and <free> trade…a new regime in Iraq would serve as a dramatic and inspiring example of <freedom> for other nations in the region. (Bush, February 26, 2003)

In this passage Bush first defines Iraq as an enslaved state and then proceeds to illustrate that elsewhere in the region states can be <free>. By classifying Iraq as the weakest link in an increasingly free Middle East, Bush seeks to justify the need for regionally supported action there. His last two uses of the ideograph speak to incorporating the region into the world community through trade. They also speak about <freedom> as a process that, once taken root in Iraq, will spread from state to state within the region allowing for a more stable regional bloc and easier acceptance into the world community. In any event, this use of <freedom> invites the regionalist interpretation where the term means that once Saddam Hussein is removed and a democracy established, the United States will leave and allow Iraq to become the dominant regional hegemon of the Middle East, spreading <freedom> to its neighbors and thereby establishing stability for the region.

Bush articulates this notion of <freedom> as a process, saying, "A liberated Iraq can show the power of <freedom> to transform that vital region, by bringing hope and progress into the lives of millions" (Bush, February 26, 2003). This statement indicates a hope that a "<freedom> revolution" will spread throughout the region once Iraq shows it can succeed at self-government. The persuasive force of the ideograph prompts an implicit understanding of the benefit of <freedom>-once the obstacle is removed it speaks under its own initiative. This appeals to regionalists, who hold that the United States cannot remain in the region once it is stable, and that the region must then be allowed to develop on its own.

<Freedom> for regionalists is a process that, once taken root in Iraq, will spread to surrounding states. This form of freedom is once again the exportation of the American version, however the strategic use differs from unilateral or multilateral approaches. In appealing to regionalists, Bush calls upon other states in the Middle East to help create a <free> region to demonstrate the foreign policy he is advocating is concerned not just with Iraq, but with the stability of the entire area, and that only through the entrenchment of <freedom> in Iraq can it spread to other nations in the Middle East. This "weak-link" argument justifies the involvement of both the United States and surrounding states in the establishment of their version of <freedom> in Iraq. Coalition Building: We Like Those Who Like Us

Unilateralists understand <freedom> as sanctioning the dictated actions of a single state, multilateralists see it as a cause for collective action, and regionalists translate <freedom> into a self-emergent process. Coalition builders hold that a state does not act alone but is also not hamstrung by the difficult requirements to build an international collective consensus for action. They position the hegemon in the role of the leader of other like minded states toward a foreign policy goal, in this case the disarmament of, and regime change in, Iraq. The strategic use of <freedom> when appealing to this foreign policy discourse community focuses on using the term in a way that encourages coalition builders to interpret it as a mobilizing cause for action by like-minded states.

Seen from this vantage, Bush uses <freedom> to make clear that it is a cause to which several nations, not only the United States, have rallied: "For the sake of peace in the world, and for <freedom> to the Iraqi people, we will disarm Saddam Hussein. And by we, it's more than America. A lot of nations will join us" (Bush, March 6, 2003). By clearly stating the "we" is not everyone, but also did not represent the United States alone, and connecting this effort with bringing <freedom> to the Iraqi people, Bush articulates the cause that mobilizes and drives the international coalition. Coalition builders recognize this as different from a multilaterist approach in that there is no implicit call for consensus, rather recognition that others will be following the American lead.

This crusade to bring <freedom> to an oppressed people is one which only <free> nations can join. For multilateralists <freedom> is perceived as a responsibility and an obligation for all <free> nations, but coalition builders emphasize following one nation as the leader and giving other states the option to join while not requiring them to do so. Bush states, "All <free> nations have a stake in preventing sudden and catastrophic attacks. And we're asking them to join us, and many are doing so" (Bush, January 28, 2003). By asking states to join, but not forcing them to do so by referring explicitly to responsibility or requirement, Bush is able to appeal for support from the coalition building foreign policy discourse community. This is an optional coalition of the <free> who seek to root out oppression and terror and liberate a people, not a mandatory multilateral force.

Bush makes very clear that the United States is leading this coalition, and that there are specific elements to the <freedom> planned for Iraq. Bush states, "For the sake of our future <freedom> and for the sake of world peace, if the UN can't act, and if Saddam Hussein won't act, the United States will lead a coalition of nations to disarm Saddam Hussein" (Bush, November 3, 2003). <Freedom> once again is used in a way that encourages coalition builders to view it as the cause for the formation of a coalition under the direction of the United States, not a multilateral force under the auspices of the UN. The specific elements of the <freedom> Bush's coalition will bring are expressed directly to the Iraqi people as follows:

As our coalition takes away their power, we will deliver the food and medicine you need. We will tear down the apparatus of terror and we will help you to build a new Iraq that is prosperous and <free>. In a <free> Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression against your neighbors, no more poison factories, no more executions of dissidents, no more torture chambers and rape rooms. (Bush, March 17, 2003)

This <freedom> mentions nothing of a replacement government or of broader long-term policy intentions, but only starts to sketch those oppressive policies that will be eliminated. The words "democracy" and "trade," words often linked with <freedom>, are not uttered here though the ideograph is used to establish a very vague cause. In this vague definition Bush makes it seem that the <freedom> the coalition will establish is a form all in the coalition agree to establish.

Bush uses <freedom> to appeal to coalition builders by recognizing three important components. First, he emphasizes the United States will not be acting unilaterally. Second, he recognizes that consensus is not necessary when states with the same values and goals constitute the group taking action. And finally, he portrays the <freedom> being brought to Iraq as the <freedom> shared by all in the coalition.

The term <freedom> has a culturally specific definition, but the interpretation of that definition varies depending upon the foreign policy discourse community addressed by President Bush. Unilateralists see the term <freedom> as employed to justify the action of the single state. Multilateralists interpret <freedom> as an attempt to garner international consensus for action. Regionalists understand Bush's use of <freedom> as justifying immediate action for the long-term benefits of a regional bloc. Finally, coalition builders identify with <freedom> as a cause which states who have like values rally behind.

The analytical approach taken in this essay for examining an ideograph yields a greater understanding of political rhetorical strategies used for making international crisis appeals. As illustrated here, Bush uses <freedom> to simultaneously encourage the support of the foreign policy discourse communities he addresses. The ideograph's power is determined as much by the context as the cultural acceptance of the term itself. Each group's potential interpretation is strategic, therefore making the ideograph itself a powerful rhetorical tool for expressing policy orientations. In effect, <freedom> is a clever way of simultaneously appealing to multiple political discourse communities for support of his policy initiatives regarding Iraq.

Ironically, <freedom> is a prominent and powerful "rhetoric of control" for presidents over the public, and more often helps directs a specific policy action than sparks a discussion over the merits of that action. The ideograph of <freedom> can be an important instrument for quelling, or at least shaping, attempts at promoting a public that critically analyzes and debates public policy. <Freedom> is used to justify, persuade, describe, and rally peoples, states, and nations, but not to spark discussion. Of the four different discourse communities and four different interpretations of <freedom>, unilateralism and coalition building seem the most resistant to critical public sentiment, but even when the word is used it does not preclude support from the other two discourse communities.

Although Bush has been viewed as promoting a unilateralist approach, in actuality he appeals to a range of different policy-oriented communities. It is also unfair to characterize Bush as a failed multilateralist as he appealed to four different foreign policy discourse communities with respect to the Iraq situation. Even looked at cynically, if Bush simply made overtures to multilateralists without caring about being multilateral then he was not really a failed multilateralist since he did not actually try to be one. In any event, for each group he used the same ideograph to attempt to gather support for his policies toward Iraq from a disparate group of foreign policy discourse communities; whether he actually enjoyed the wide range of support he sought is another matter entirely.

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