On June 13, 2002, the United States formally withdrew from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed with the leadership of the former Soviet Union. In accordance with the auspices of the original agreement, President George W. Bush served notice of his decision to abrogate the treaty six months earlier, setting off an intense round of bilateral diplomacy aimed at keeping the U.S. within the normative confines of the treaty. What makes this event remarkable and odd, particularly from a rhetorical perspective, is the nearly complete lack of response and criticism from the leaders of Russia once Bush actually abandoned the treaty. Having labeled the treaty a "cornerstone of strategic stability," it is surprising that the response from President Putin and his Ministry of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov was so muted. Despite their initial objections and often bitter opposition to Bush's plans for missile defense, "the treaty's demise met largely with silence" (Boese, 2002, p.14). When the United States finally withdrew from the agreement, "it caused hardly a blip on the radar screen" (Dale, 2002, 1). The lack of response from the Russian leadership was touted by many as a major victory for the Bush administration (Hartung, 2001b) . Fuelner (2002) argued that Bush had effectively silenced the criticism not only of the domestic arms control community, but the Russians as well. The catastrophic impact on U.S.-Russian relations, adumbrated by missile defense opponents in the domestic arms control establishment and from the Congress, simply did not come to pass. As the Russian Foreign Ministry accused the U.S. of trying to wreck the nuclear arms control process, the Defense Ministry concluded that there were "no grounds to retaliate against Washington for abandoning the ABM Treaty" (APS Diplomatic Recorder, 2002, 1). Even Russia's suggestions that it could withdraw from the START-II Treaty in response to U.S. plans for missile defense were "largely symbolic given that START-II never entered into force" (Boese, 2002, p.14).

This sequence of events calls forth several interesting research questions. First, why did the Russian leaders acquiesce in the face of American plans for ballistic missile defense (BMD) when their opposition at the beginning of Bush's presidency had been so venomous? Second, and more importantly from a rhetorical perspective, to what degree can the muted Russian response to Bush's decision to abrogate the ABM Treaty be attributed to the arguments and rhetorical strategies employed by the President? Further, if the Russian response, or lack thereof, was not due to the persuasive power of Bush's appeals, then what factors begin to explain it? Third, how did Bush's arguments function with and impact upon the domestic U.S. audience? The potentially negative Russian response to missile defense was a core concern of the Congress, the public, and of the American arms control community. This essay will begin to answer these questions by examining the nature of Russian opinions toward missile defense, identifying the core concerns and objections held by the Russian leadership, and by uncovering and examining the most critical arguments made by the Bush administration to justify BMD to the Russian audience. I will argue that the strategies employed by the Bush administration were ultimately addressed at overlapping audiences. On the one hand, the President had to assure the Congress, public, and experts that Russia would not respond to BMD by either "lashing out" or building more offensive rockets to overwhelm the American defenses. On the other hand, Bush had to persuade the Russian leaders that American missile defenses were not aimed at negating Russia's strategic deterrent.

Russian skepticism and fear about President Bush's plans for missile defense was centered upon three primary objections. First and foremost, Russian leaders were concerned that Bush planned to quickly abrogate the ABM Treaty, an arms control agreement that the Russians believed to be the critical cornerstone of U.S.-Russian nuclear policy. Igor Ivanov (2000) argued that many of the modern nuclear arms control agreements, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties (SALT I & II), as well as the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I & II), were contingent upon strict U.S. adherence to the ABM Treaty (p.15). He argued that if this "foundation is destroyed, this interconnected system will collapse, nullifying 30 years of efforts by the world community" (2000, p.15). In an even stronger rebuke of Bush's plans, Russia threatened to withdraw from START I & II, and to not ratify START III if the U.S. were to "unilaterally withdraw" from the ABM Treaty (Ivanov, 2000, p.15). The Russians, who had just negotiated and ratified an agreement with President Clinton to strengthen the ABM Treaty, were concerned that any bargaining power or leverage that had resulted would be eliminated if Bush simply ignored the new agreements and unilaterally withdrew from or modified the treaty (Safranchuk, 2001). It is difficult to overstate the strength of Russia's rhetorical opposition to Bush's plans for missile defense. When Bush came into power, the most influential figures in Russian foreign policy united against plans for BMD; at one time or another, President Putin, former President Boris Yeltsin, Minister of Defense Yergei Sergeev, and Igor Ivanov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, had all repeatedly expressed grave concerns about Bush's plans to abrogate the treaty or to deploy missile defense (Safranchuk, 2001). In some ways, Russia purposefully raised the stakes in the missile defense debate when Bush took power; they demanded the "complete elimination" of American BMD plans knowing full well that Bush had campaigned on a pro-missile defense platform and intended on pursuing the system. For the Russians, at least in terms of their public diplomatic language, adherence to the 1972 ABM Treaty was non-negotiable.

Russian concerns about U.S. plans for missile defense were not without warrant. The leaders of Russia were probably not simply "playing politics" with the new American administration, they were also genuinely worried that missile defenses could erode their strategic nuclear deterrent and create a need to roll back the nuclear reductions enshrined in the SALT and START agreements. Ivanov argued that the potential threats to Russian nuclear parity could not be brushed aside simply because President Bush envisioned a "limited" or "thin" defense (2000, p.16). Instead, Russia countered with ideas for a limited theater-based missile defense, to be jointly developed after consensus had been reached regarding the nature and timeframe of the ballistic missile threat to both countries (Newsday, 2001, P.A18). Russian fears about the impact of American missile defenses were also compounded by the possibility that BMD might actually work, thus negating Russia's ability to strike back in the event of U.S. nuclear first-strike. Given that Russia's second-strike capability may be as small as "tens" of weapons, "the Russians will assume that the interceptors would work, and that their deterrent arsenal could be checkmated by the Americans in this situation" (Blair, 2000, 3). Additionally, due to economic pressures, Russia would likely be forced to slash its strategic nuclear forces down to a number in the hundreds. In a world in which the U.S. had deployed an effective missile defense, depleted Russian rocket forces could be overwhelmed (Blair, 2000, 2). Even if Russian leaders discounted the abilities of an initial "limited" American missile defense, they still held the suspicion that "the United States' real scheme is to lay the groundwork for a later fast thickening of the defenses that would be designed to negate their deterrent" (Blair, 2000, 4). Even in the event that U.S. missile defenses were not "aimed" at Russia, the leadership still viewed BMD as a threat "to its status as the strategic nuclear equal of the US" (Slocombe, 2001, 4).

A third source of Russian resentment toward Bush's BMD plans was based upon what the Russian leaders saw as an over-exaggerated threat of missile proliferation. The Russian leadership was simply not convinced that either the U.S. or Russia faced a legitimate threat of missile attack in the immediate future. Peterson (2001) argued that "Russians say the future missile threat is overblown" and that missile defense "is less about U.S. protection and more about the way it sees itself in a new global view" (p.1). Russian authorities believed that the types of missile threats outlined as justification for BMD were neither a current threat, nor were they likely to emerge within the next 15 years, as U.S. intelligence estimates indicated (Safranchuk, 2001). Given Russia's position on emergent ballistic missile threats, it is not difficult to see why they believed that American missile defenses were aimed at them, rather than at so-called rogue states with fledgling rocket programs.

President Bush faced a complex rhetorical situation when he began the process of marketing his missile defense plans to the Russians. Bush needed to sell a controversial weapons system to suspicious Russian leaders who already were angry over American expulsion of diplomats and the harsh rhetoric directed at Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. Russian proclamations that a unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty would spark a new arms race and collapse the global arms control infrastructure only fueled domestic concerns in the U.S. among the public, Congress, and arms control community. The handling of the Russian component in Bush's struggle to deploy missile defenses was critical to gaining both domestic and foreign acceptance of his plans.

The Bush administration had to gain Russian acceptance of U.S. missile defense at all costs. If Russia only grudgingly accepted Bush's plans for BMD, the President could claim at least partial victory. In order to achieve this goal, Bush and his BMD spokespersons engaged in an all-out diplomatic offensive to try and defuse Russian objections to the system. The strategies employed were numerous, overlapping, and often contradictory. Here, I isolate two primary rhetorical strategies that characterize Bush's attempt to induce Russian acquiescence on missile defense. First, the Bush administration took many steps to ensure that the Russia leadership believed that missile defense, in one form or another, was inevitable. Second, Bush used a two-pronged strategy designed to limit Russian fears and American domestic concerns that BMD could negate Russia's nuclear deterrent, and that abandonment of the ABM Treaty could unravel global nuclear arms control.. Bush promised only to pursue BMD in conjunction with offensive nuclear cuts, argued that American missile defenses were not aimed at undermining Russia's nuclear deterrent, and that Russia and the United States faced similar emerging missile threats.

One of the primary strategies of the Bush administration was to make the Russian leadership believe that American missile defenses in some form would inevitably be deployed. Perhaps if the Russians believed that missile defenses were coming no matter what, they would not put up much of a fight. In a campaign stump speech at the Citadel, Bush outlined how he would approach the missile defense issue:

At the earliest possible date, my administration will deploy anti-ballistic missile systems, both theater and national, to guard against attack and blackmail. To make this possible, we will offer Russia the necessary amendments to the anti-ballistic missile treaty- an artifact of Cold War confrontation. Both sides know that we live in a different world from 1972, when that treaty was signed. If Russia refuses the changes we propose, we will give prompt notice, under the provisions of the treaty, that we can no longer be a party to it (Bush, 1999a, 7)

This statement seemed to lay out Bush's policy toward the Russians fairly clearly. They would be given the chance to accept fundamental U.S. changes to the ABM Treaty, or they could watch as the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the treaty. Why then, after repeated proclamations on the campaign trail and early in his Presidency, did Bush continue to pretend that the Russian leadership had a stake in negotiating or consulting on the matter?

In a campaign speech where Bush explained his foreign policy priorities, he indicated that "America must build effective missile defenses, based on the best available options, at the earliest possible date" (Bush, 2000b, 3). Bush promised to make the construction of missile defenses a "priority", to "move quickly", to deploy an adequate defense, and "not to defend outdated treaties, but to defend the American people" (Bush, 2000c; Bush, 2000d; Bush, 2000e). However, the inherent contradiction at the heart of Bush's argument was laid bare in a subsequent speech on missile defense at National Defense University (NDU). Here, Bush reversed himself and argued that while he himself favored the deployment of missile defenses, decisions upon how to pursue future BMD plans would only be made after genuine consultation with all interested parties, including the leaders of Russia. Referring to the missile defense consultation process, Bush argued that "we are not presenting our friends and allies with unilateral decisions already made" (2001d, p.687)! This statement must have befuddled the Russians, who heard on one hand that Bush would deploy BMD at the "earliest possible date", but also heard that a unilateral decision to deploy missile defenses had not yet been rendered. Which promise did Bush intend to keep? Did President Bush intend to deploy missile defenses unilaterally, or to give the Russian leadership the chance to negotiate about the system, and to possibly reject its development?

A month after the speech at National Defense University, in an address at the NATO conference in Belgium, Bush muddied the waters even more. He argued that "I don't think we're going to have to move, as they say, unilaterally. I think people are coming our way. But people know that I'm intent on doing what I think is the right thing on order to make the world more peaceful" (Bush, 2001e, p.894). Here, Bush seemed to indicate that he thought the Russians would go along with the changes he had proposed to the ABM Treaty. But, he also seemed to be repeating that Russian objections would be overlooked in the interest of "doing the right thing". Bush's diplomatic maneuvers were the definition of "prior notice" as opposed to genuine consultation. Bush was simply informing the Russians that they had no power to stop plans for development of missile defenses or to preserve the ABM Treaty.

President Bush's missile defense mouthpieces, Rumsfeld and Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz also reinforced the seeming contradiction between consultation and unilateral action. In a Sunday morning television news interview, Rumsfeld responded to questions about the missile defense consultation process with Russia in the following way:

Q: The President has said if the Russians would not accept the amendments, he would go ahead and serve notice that we're going to get out of the treaty and go ahead with missile defense. Is that still the administration's position?

Rumsfeld: Well, the president's not changed his words or his mind (Rumsfeld, 2001b, question 12)

Rumsfeld's answer seems to beg the question, why even consult with the Russians if their objections carry no weight? In July of 2001, Rumsfeld issued statements that began to shed some light on the real intention of the Bush administration: not to jointly amend the ABM Treaty with Russia, but to abandon it altogether. Rumsfeld argued that instead of America being seen as trying to "re-interpret" the treaty, a strict constructionist approach that abrogated the Treaty altogether would be more clear-cut and expedient (Rumsfeld, 2001c).

In an interview with PBS Newshour later in the summer of 2001, the position of the Bush administration with regard to the ongoing missile defense consultations with Russia became obvious. Rumsfeld made it clear that these were not consultations at all, but negotiations designed to induce Russia to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty with the United States, or as negotiations designed to serve notice that the United States was ready to withdraw by itself if Russia declined to "play ball". Rumsfeld also indirectly revealed one of the main assumptions underwriting the U.S. approach to the Russians: Because Russia maintained a missile defense capability limited to Moscow, and because Russia had cooperated with "rogue" states like Iran on nuclear and missile technology, it should forfeit any right to object to American missile defense plans. Rumsfeld characterized the Russian position as "they want to be free to have us not develop a ballistic missile defense capability, although they have a missile defense capability around Moscow with nuclear-tipped interceptors right now" (Rumsfeld, 2001d).

Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz echoed the rhetorical strategies of Bush and Rumsfeld. Wolfowitz framed the "consultations" with Russia as "ongoing discussions" about which "we have no reason to believe they will fail" (2001b, p.7). The goal was to convince the Russians to give up the ABM Treaty right along with the United States. If that diplomatic tactic failed, Wolfowitz continued to assert that the U.S. would simply withdraw unilaterally:

if we give Russia the mistaken impression that by insisting on adherence to the ABM Treaty, they can exercise a veto over our development of missile defenses, the unintended consequence could be to rule out a cooperative solution and perhaps leave the President no choice but to withdraw from the treaty unilaterally (p.7).

The Bush administration wanted to be clear: Russia would not have veto power over American plans for missile defense. How then, could these negotiations be described as genuine consultation?

In a true consultation, one party asks the other about how they will react to a proposed policy action. In consultation, there is an assumption that both sides will compromise to reach a mutually desirable outcome. The U.S. made it clear that Russia's negotiating positions would not really be taken into account, because a final decision to deploy missile defenses had already been made. The Bush administration essentially decided to withdraw from the ABM Treaty and deploy missile defenses, regardless of how the Russians felt about that decision. Under the guise of genuine consultation, the Russian leaders would be informed of Bush's decisions, and would be offered the chance to go along with those decisions and portray ABM withdrawal as a joint action. If Russia refused that option, Bush would withdraw from the ABM Treaty unilaterally.

Given this interpretation, why did it make strategic sense for Bush to engage in false consultation with the Russians? First, Bush wanted the Russian leaders to know from the outset that he would go forward on missile defense development with or without their blessing. If the Russians did not believe they could stop American missile defense, perhaps they wouldn't try. The Bush administration was holding out for a joint ABM Treaty withdrawal in order to save some face with the international community. However, as many other Bush policies seem to indicate, concern for international opinion is rarely a sufficient cause for hesitation. Giving prior notice to our allies about imminent policy actions is not consultation, and while "the Bush team has talked with Moscow and U.S. allies, it also plows ahead, come what may, without specifying when, how, or why it intends to violate the treaty" (Clemens, 2001, p.38).

Second, and more importantly, the reason Bush attempted to make his unilateral decisions seem cooperative was to fend off domestic criticism that his plans for missile defense would prompt a negative response from Russia. Bush engaged in a half-hearted attempt to get the Russians to go along with his plans to abandon the ABM Treaty. If he had succeeded, he could have pointed to the "consultations" as a way to squash opposition from the Congress and the arms control community. In the event of a failure, the "consultations" at least allowed the President to argue that he had done everything possible to come to an agreement with the Russians, thus at least partially defusing criticism that Bush's missile defense plans were unilateral all along.

In the end, the "consultations" failed. Russia would not budge in its opposition to missile defenses, and American efforts to effectuate a joint withdrawal from the ABM Treaty were rebuffed. However, Bush probably did succeed in convincing the Russians that missile defenses were coming no matter how loudly they objected. The Russian leaders were certainly able to see through Bush's "genuine consultations". The ruse of genuine consultation was played out to silence U.S. opposition to Bush's plans from the public and the Congresss, and was not aimed at the Russians, who figured out the punch-line as soon as Bush was elected President. The Russian leaders knew what was coming, and they also chose the "consultation" process as a way to save face and stand up to American unilateralism, even though the outcome had already been predetermined. Strangely, even after Bush announced his decision to unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty, he still promised to consult with Russia about the development and direction of missile defenses (2002a). On June 13, 2002, the day the ABM Treaty officially expired, Bush again promised that he and the Russian leaders would "deepen our dialogue" about the future of American missile defenses (2002b, p.1011). How real were these consultations? Was President Bush just trying to rub it in?

One of the primary concerns of both the Russian leadership and the American domestic audience was how U.S. missile defenses would impact Russian nuclear forces, and whether an abandonment of the ABM Treaty would have a spillover effect on global arms control efforts. To address these concerns, the Bush administration relied upon two primary rhetorical strategies. First, missile defense would be marketed in conjunction with large-scale, unilateral reductions in U.S. nuclear forces. Second, the Bush camp would argue that Russia was not the enemy, or an intended "target" of U.S. missile defenses, and that both countries faced similar, emerging missile threats.

On January 29, 2001, days after taking office, President Bush pledged to unilaterally reduce American nuclear arsenals in conjunction with the pursuit of defensive ABM capabilities (2001a, p.209). Donald Rumsfeld echoed these sentiments, and took the strategy a step further when he argued that President Bush was pursuing a "new approach to strategic deterrence, one that will combine deep reductions in offensive nuclear forces with improved conventional capabilities and the development and deployment of missile defenses" (2002, 6). However, there was reason to question the intent and motivation behind these strategies. Gallivan (2000) argued that "without any hard data or real numbers to back it up, Bush's talk about deep cuts in our nuclear arsenal is just that: talk" (2). Gallivan also indicated that Bush's strategy was a purely rhetorical move, designed to blunt criticism about BMD from domestic audiences who were concerned about the impact on arms control. Again, Bush's strategies seemed to be as much about controlling the opinions of the domestic audience as they were about convincing the Russian leaders to get on board.

Drinan (2000) questioned the degree to which the Bush administration actually believed in the merits of nuclear arms control. He argued that years of opposition to the Soviet Evil Empire "is too much a part of the psyche of the hawks in Congress and at the Pentagon for them to think that nuclear weapons could be obsolete" (p.20). Hartung (2001) argued that rather than functioning as a vehicle to make nuclear weapons obsolete, Bush's missile defense system and proposed strategic nuclear force reductions would give the President the political cover to develop a new generation of battlefield nuclear weapons that would be more usable in a world in which the U.S. was not threatened with nuclear retaliation (a world in which an effective missile defense was deployed) (p.4). Grier (2001) argued that the proposed nuclear force reductions were simply another example of U.S. nuclear unilateralism. As in the case of missile defense, "while the President will seek to persuade Russia to join us in further reducing nuclear arsenals, he is also prepared to lead by example" (p.1). When Russia surprisingly agreed to cooperate on nuclear reductions with the U.S., despite Bush's plans to deploy missile defense, the Bush administration promptly indicated that "the U.S. would only store and not dismantle its own warheads", and that it was no longer "seeking a new treaty or agreement on nuclear reduction with Russia" (Lieven, 2002, p.8)!

President Bush never had much intention of entering into broad arms control agreements with Russia. Instead, he used these promises to placate domestic arms control advocates in the public, Congress, and expert establishment who opposed missile defense on the grounds that it could collapse global arms control. Ultimately, after the U.S. had already withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, the President decided that binding arms control agreements could hamper his plans to resume nuclear testing and develop new types of nuclear weapons. The ruse of missile defense combined with nuclear force reductions was a rhetorical ploy, a false promise, by the Bush administration. Even if the U.S. were to unilaterally reduce its offensive nuclear forces, it would also be free to drastically increase those forces as it desired, so long as those cuts were not codified with a bilateral treaty.

The Bush administration still needed to convince the Russian leaders that missile defense would not negate its strategic deterrent. Indeed, changing this perception was the critical lynchpin in the overall strategy. If Russia could be convinced that American BMD was not a threat, it would be more likely to cooperate, or at least go along without much of a fight. However, if Russia was not persuaded, and chose to pull out of arms control agreements or to MIRV (Multiple Impact Re-Entry Vehicle) its nuclear missiles, then the perceptions of the doomsayers in the American public, Congress, and arms control establishment would be much more difficult to control.

Bush employed two principal strategies to alleviate Russian insecurities about the value of its nuclear arsenal in world of American missile defenses. First, Bush, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz went to great lengths to assure Russia that it was not an enemy and would not be treated as one. The Bush administration argued that the U.S. and Russia faced similar missile threats, and thus had a mutual interest in cooperation on missile defense development. Second, they argued that the Russian rocket forces could easily overwhelm "limited" American missile defenses, and thus presented no threat to Russian deterrence.

The Bush administration found itself, once again, in a situation that required a reversal in rhetorical strategy. Bush now needed to convince the Russian leaders, the same people that he had labeled "active proliferators", chastised over Iran, and accused of large-scale military espionage, that they were not considered an "enemy" or a "threat" to the United States. Despite this glaring contradiction in the President's rhetorical framing of the Russian leadership, the administration went forth to cement a new friendship. Bush argued as early as 1999, in a campaign speech, that Russia and the United States, "instead of confronting each other, confront the legacy of a dead ideological rivalry" (1999b). Just after taking office, and around the time of the Russian espionage unmasking and subsequent diplomat ejection, President Bush was arguing, at least in the context of missile defense, that "the Cold War has passed, we are not Russia's enemy, I don't view Russia as our enemy either, and that there will be new threats that we have to deal with" (2001c, p.337).

Rumsfeld, days after he was sworn in as the Secretary of Defense, argued that "the concern for the United States today is not a massive nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union; the Soviet Union is gone; it doesn't exist" (2001b, p.210). As a way to create the perception of mutual interest in missile defense, Bush argued that Russia and the U.S. faced many of the same types of missile threats:

The emerging security threats to the United States, to its friends and allies, and even to Russia, now come from rogue states, terrorist groups, and other adversaries seeking weapons of mass destruction. It is time to leave the Cold War behind (2000a).

As a way to shift the focus away from Russian perceptions that they were indeed the "target" of American missile defense plans, Bush cast terrorists and rogue states as the reason to deploy a missile shield. These diplomatic strategies were directed at the Russian leaders on two occasions, both occurred after September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. At a press conference on October the 11th, Bush made clear his intent to deploy the "mutual threats" argument with Russian President Putin. He indicated that

in terms of missile defense, I can't wait to visit with Vladmir Putin to reiterate once again that the Cold War is over, it's done with, and that there are new threats that we face, and what better example of that new threat than the attack on America on September 11th (2001f, p.1454).

When Bush announced the formal U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, on December 13, 2001, he repeated his claim that the attacks on 9/11 proved that the "greatest threats to both of our countries come not from each other, but from terrorists who strike without warning" (2001g, p.1783).

In another rhetorical strategy designed to allay Russian fears about missile defense, both Secretary Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz argued that Bush's design for BMD posed no threat to the Russian nuclear arsenal. After repeating that "Russia is not our enemy", Wolfowitz (2001) argued that "our missile defenses will not be a threat to Russia" because limited American defenses would be aimed at knocking down a handful of terrorist missiles, rather than the inconceivable task of intercepting thousands of Russian ICBMs (p.8). Rumsfeld echoed those arguments, and indicated that "the systems that are being discussed are not in any way relevant to the Russians with their hundreds and thousands of missiles" (2001a).

The rhetorical and diplomatic approach taken by Bush in this instance was probably ineffective. While the President attempted to convince the Russian leaders that they would not be treated as enemies, the prior rhetoric and diplomatic actions of the administration sent an altogether different message. The Russians were already skeptical about what they perceived to be overblown missile threats from rogue states and terrorists, and the rhetorical attempts at creating the perception of "mutual threats" was not persuasive. After all, Bush never offered to develop BMD jointly with the Russians, and the notion that American NMD would be "shared" or jointly operated with the Russians was nothing more than an "overtly political gimmick," Bush would never share "real hardware that costs real money that has a real national security impact" (Sherman, 2001, p.3). Bush's rhetorical strategies probably also did little to ease Russian fears about the negation of its deterrent. Generic claims that "limited" defenses could be easily overwhelmed by the Russians did not really speak to the cause of Russian concern. The real fear among the Russian leaders was that due to economic pressures, there may not be "thousands" of Russian rockets available to penetrate American defenses. The Russians were also skeptical about how "limited" the U.S. defenses would be. The fear was that what may have begun as a limited, theater defense could turn into a global or at least truly national American missile defense shield.

There is also some evidence to support the claim that the leaders of Russia were at least partially influenced by the ongoing missile defense debates in America, particularly after the September 11th attacks. While the Russians were not necessarily persuaded by the "mutual threat" arguments put forth by the Bush White House, they were sympathetic to the claim that 9/11 was a strong rationale for the development of missile defenses. Feller (2002) argued that the "September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States enhanced the credibility of Washington's arguments in favor of building anti-missile defense systems" (p.4). After the attacks, Feller indicated that Russian "opposition to U.S. construction of a missile defense shield is softening" (2002, p.4). While a few of Bush's rhetorical strategies can be credited with helping to secure Russian tolerance of missile defenses, several key domestic issues probably also influenced the Russian leadership. First, it was not in the national security interest of Russia to respond to ABM withdrawal by developing more offensive nuclear forces or by pulling out of arms control agreements. Russia needed arms control because it simply could not afford to maintain the thousands of nuclear warheads and missiles it inherited from the former Soviet Union. Second, "Putin's Kremlin decided to yield to Bush's initiative on missile defense, while trying to save as much face as possible" (Baker, 2002, p.131). Putin faced mounting domestic pressure in regards to the poor state of the economy, the underpaid military, and the growing threat from Islamic fundamentalism in Chechnya. As a result, Putin had to choose his battles wisely. In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, and with Russian opposition to missile defense easing somewhat, Putin simply decided not to make ABM withdrawal a big issue.

In the final analysis, examination of Bush's diplomacy surrounding the U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty reveals that while many called it a "victory" for the newly-elected President, it was a "hollow" win at best. Bush's consultation with Putin and the other leaders of Russia was not consultation at all. Framed as the start of a new strategic partnership, Bush's missile defense diplomacy was nothing more than "prior notice" of the inevitable development and deployment of American missile defenses. Far from qualifying as deft or sophisticated diplomatic and rhetorical maneuvering, Bush's strategic approach was transparent and slapshod.. While Bush's approach did allow for both sets of opposing leadership to defuse domestic backlash toward BMD, it did little to allay the real fears of the Russian leadership about the future form and scope of American missile defenses.

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